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Abstract
Global models of agriculture act as the epistemic basis for quantitative foresight, which guides 
international policymaking and research on agriculture. With the new political sociology of science 
as a backdrop, this article studies the actors who develop and use these models through the lens 
of field theory. Contributing to the dialogue between the neo-institutionalist field theory and its 
Bourdieusian version, it describes the structure and the dynamics of the strategic action field of 
modelling organizations, using the Bourdieusian notions of ‘succession’ and ‘subversion’ to refine 
the characterization of challengers. It also discusses the insights of the Bourdieusian concept of 
‘homology’ to analyse the relations between the field of model producers and the field of model 
users. Whereas Bourdieu provides a primarily descriptive account of homologies, which are close 
to a “social magic without magicians” for Roueff, the present text describes magicians doing the 
work of producing homologies. Some modelers use intercomparison to reduce competition 
and to have their models used in the field of global governance, thus strategically producing 
homologies, while resolving the main modelling conflict of the field. These actors benefit from 
the recent evolution of the modelling field under the influence of climate change, to behave as 
what Fligstein and McAdam have called ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. The article concludes that 
field theory makes it possible to describe the co-construction of a range of models developed by 
competing organizations and the controversial making of global agricultural governance. Doing 
so, it complements the co-production framework, which often focuses on a given site of expertise 
production and a site of global governance.
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Introduction
The 2008 economic and financial crisis shook the 
agricultural sector. A sudden rise in global agri-
cultural prices (mainly grains) and massive acqui-
sition of farmland by foreign investors hit several 
developing countries, and fanned the flames of 
political disputes in the so-called Arab Spring. 
This crisis reminded us of the vulnerability of 
agro-food systems that have become globalized. 
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Climate change and the financialization of agri-
cultural markets creates concerns that resource 
pressures, and resulting episodes of agricultural 
and food price volatility, would become more fre-
quent. In this troubled context, economic models 
of world agriculture are the primary knowledge 
tools that decision-makers use to reflect on the 
future of agriculture and to arbitrate between pol-
icy options at an international scale. The accuracy 
of these models is under scrutiny by experts from 
the Food and Agriculture Organizations of the 
United Nations (FAO), the World Bank, the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) – a 
research institute in economics part of the Consul-
tative Group in International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) – and more broadly within the academic 
field of agricultural economics, dominated by 
American, European, and Chinese universities. 
The 2008 crisis questions the way these models 
are elaborated and evaluated, and by whom. Yet, 
if the role of models in the global governance of 
agriculture is crucial, they have received less focus 
than in the cases of finance (McKenzie, 2006) or cli-
mate change (Dahan, 2007).
The co-production framework (Jasanoff, 2004) 
helps to understand the politics of models. 
Models are ‘mediators’ between theory and the 
real system (Morgan and Morrison, 1999). They 
stabilize a state of the art on a given topic in order 
to build prospective scenarios, which are increas-
ingly used by decision-makers in a normative 
fashion. Based on a specific set of knowledge 
and assumptions, they contribute to ‘perform’ 
public policies in a specific way (Armatte, 2010; 
Henriksen, 2013). Previous work has shown how 
models of world agriculture based in neoclas-
sical theory lay the groundwork for scenarios 
which offer a limited set of options for the future. 
As small-scale agriculture is ‘invisibilized’ in such 
models (Leblond and Trottier, 2016), the scenarios 
they enable to develop tend to promote tech-
nology-intensive agriculture over agroecology, 
and free-trade over food sovereignty (Fouilleux, 
2010; Cornilleau, 2016). Hence, economic models 
represent certain ‘worlds’ that they help perform 
through scenario building. But why are certain 
models deemed more legitimate than others? 
What are the mechanisms of the competition 
between different models of a given problem, 
such as world agriculture?
In line with the new political sociology of 
science, I seek to complement the co-production 
framework by stressing the “unequal distribu-
tions of power and resources” (Frickel and Moore, 
2006: 10) in modelling activity. The co-production 
perspective, by paying symmetrical attention to 
the “dominant point of view” and the “marginal-
ized alternatives” (Jasanoff, 2004: 280), has already 
worked in this direction. Research inspired by 
Desrosières (2008) has analysed the production 
and use of alternative statistics, using the concept 
of ‘statactivism’ (Bruno et al., 2014; Kurunmäki 
et al, 2016). An actor-network theory approach 
(Callon, 1986) has highlighted the drivers of the 
success of a model, defined as its ability to enrol 
users at an early stage of scenario development 
(Kieken, 2004). These studies focus respectively on 
the attempts to create alternative quantifications 
(i.e. the “marginalized alternatives”), or on the 
modalities of a success (i.e. the “dominant point 
of view”). In this article, I use a complementary 
perspective to document inequalities in modelling 
activity. My goal is to map the field of modelling 
organizations (research institutes, international 
organizations, ministries of agriculture), and to 
enlighten how world agricultural models are 
being hierarchized. Inspired by previous research 
on metrics (Paradeise and Filliatreau, 2016), I use 
neo-institutionalist field theory (Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012) while borrowing some concepts 
to Bourdieu (2015). If these perspectives rely on 
different hypotheses (Martin, 2003), the former 
was inspired by the latter. In both cases, a field is 
defined as a socially structured space of positions, 
organized through a struggle over what is specifi-
cally at stake in the field.
As the results of the modelled foresight are 
intended to circulate among experts and deci-
sion-makers, competition between models 
cannot be analysed only at the level of modelling 
organizations themselves. Models are part of the 
toolbox that States and stakeholders (companies, 
NGOs, modelling organizations themselves) use 
to influence the making of the global governance 
of agriculture. The introduction of ‘good practices’ 
(Bernstein and Van der Ven, 2017) encourages 
stakeholders to use quantified indicators in 
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advocacy and lobbying strategies, which explains 
the increased competition between indicators of 
world problems (Rottenburg et al., 2015), as in the 
case of women’s rights (Merry, 2016). Field theory 
accounts both for the dynamics in a given social 
space, and for the interactions with other social 
spheres: the modelling field can be analysed 
per se, and in interaction with the academic 
field or the field of global governance. This is 
different from the ecology of knowledge (Akera, 
2007), which describes how forms of knowledge 
co-produce institutional hierarchies, yet does not 
address the dynamics within science and within 
society. Field theory is also more appropriate to 
analyse the competition between models than 
a market-based approach, which has been used 
on standards (Reinecke et al., 2012; Fouilleux, 
Loconto, 2017). World agricultural models interact 
with economic stakes1, but they are mostly 
evaluated in scientific (they are deemed credible) 
or political (they are deemed legitimate) terms. 
A last advantage of field theory is its potential 
to illuminate the international dimension of the 
modelling field. Sociologists (Bigo, 2011, Go and 
Krause, 2016) stress that the internationalization 
of a field is non-linear, and that interactions with 
national stakes are decisive. 
A field exists only if the space of interactions 
structures actors’ behaviour to such an extent 
that it becomes a relevant level for analysis. Semi-
structured interviews with modelers showed that 
they situated their models in relation to others, 
and their representation of this space shaped the 
way they evaluated their own tools. Interviews 
gave insight into the topologies of the field: actors 
define the boundaries and the structure of the 
social space they moved within, and they describe 
their efforts to improve their position within it. In 
order to get a sense of what is at stake at the inter-
national level of this field, I conducted interviews 
both with representatives of national (French) and 
international modelling organizations. To map 
the positions of each modelling organization, and 
to track the circulation of models in governance 
and expertise, I analysed reports and minutes 
from an international research group – the Global 
Economics Team of the Agricultural Models Inter-
comparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP). 
This gave me access to debates amongst modelers 
about the evaluation and expected uses of their 
tools. The Global Economics Team of the AgMIP 
initially (2011-2013) included modelers from 
international organizations and US, Australian, 
Japanese, German, and Dutch research organi-
zations, with ten models represented2, while the 
French modelling team joined the exercise in its 
second phase.
My argument has a three-part structure. In the 
first section, I show that the field of global agricul-
tural models is not autonomous: its evolution is in 
sync with the ‘climatisation’ (Aykut et al.., 2017) of 
agricultural policies and research, i.e. the political 
demand that they take climate change into 
account. I describe how this ‘climatisation’ incites 
newcomers to enter the modelling field and how 
they tried to challenge the incumbent models. 
In the second section, the homologies between 
the field of model producers and the field of 
model users (including modelling organizations 
themselves) are highlighted: using a credible 
and legitimate model has direct effects on the 
position that institutions hold in the field of global 
governance. Last, I seek to explain the mecha-
nisms standing behind these homologies, which 
are close to a “social magic without magicians” in 
Bourdieu’s theory (Roueff, 2013). However, there 
are magicians here, and they play a central role. 
This last section shows these magicians at work: 
modelers who benefit from the recent evolution 
of the field and behave as ‘institutional entre-
preneurs’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). They 
use intercomparison within the AgMIP to reduce 
competition between models and to facilitate the 
circulation of their own models in the political 
field, thus producing homologies between the 
two fields, while solving the main conflict in the 
modelling field. I conclude that this amended 
field theory is a complement to the co-production 
framework, which has analysed jointly a given site 
of expertise and a site of global governance. 
The ‘climatisation’ of the field 
of global agricultural models
This section presents recent shifts in the field of 
global agricultural models. It has changed under 
the imperative to integrate climate change. This 
‘climatisation’ of the modelling field went hand 
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in hand with a change in its structure. A conflict 
emerged between two different traditions: the 
equilibrium models’ tradition focused on the 
economy was challenged by the integrated mod-
els’ tradition, which better represented the links 
between the economy and climate change. 
From trade to climate: Models and the inter-
national agenda of agriculture
For Bourdieu, as well as for Fligstein and McAdam, 
a field is only partially autonomous from other 
fields, and inter-field relationships influence the 
structure and dynamics of a given field. Fligstein 
and McAdam (2012) think of inter-field relation-
ships in terms of their embeddedness within each 
other3, from the macro level (e. g. the global gov-
ernance field) to the micro level (e. g. an office in 
the department of a State), and compare fields to 
‘Russian dolls’4. The modelling field is not auton-
omous from the global governance field, and 
can be considered as one of its subfields. Global 
agricultural models have changed in accordance 
with shifts in international agricultural policies; 
they initially focused on the trade agenda and 
on the preparation of a ‘Doubly Green Revolu-
tion’ (Cornilleau and Joly, 2014), only to change 
their orientation when climate change became a 
priority. 
The trade agenda determined the first shift 
in economic agricultural models. In the 1970s, 
two categories of economic models coexisted: (i) 
time series models, which describe the dynamics 
of physical aggregates over time, whereas the (ii) 
first equilibrium models, which compute prices by 
balancing global supply and demand, appeared in 
the context of the 1974 world food crisis (Cornil-
leau, 2016). At the end of the 1970s, economists 
from agro-exporter countries (mostly from the 
United States of America (USA)), from the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and from the IFPRI questioned 
the ability of time series models to simulate the 
impacts of trade policies on domestic agricul-
tural prices. The reason for this was that agricul-
tural trade liberalization was under examination 
in these countries and organizations, before the 
first steps of its implementation were negoti-
ated at the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Equilibrium models5 ended up mediating contro-
versies on trade, notably on the level of agricul-
tural subsidies in the USA versus in the European 
Economic Community in the 1980s (Fouilleux, 
2000). American universities and research insti-
tutes played a leading role in the development of 
these equilibrium models. The US Department of 
Agriculture and the Ford Foundation funded the 
International Agricultural Trade Research Center 
(IATRC), a think tank whose goal was to equip 
the OECD and the GATT negotiations with the 
economic toolkit that delegitimized subsidies and 
led to trade liberalization in agriculture (Joly and 
Lacombe, 2017). The US also supported networks 
of modelers working on the development of an 
international agricultural database, such as the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) created in 
1991 at the Purdue University in interaction with 
the FAO and the OECD (Leblond and Trottier, 
2016; Dorin and Joly, 2019), which is still widely 
used today. In the 1990s, equilibrium models 
were developed by other institutions for different 
purposes, such as the IFPRI with the International 
Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commod-
ities and Trade (IMPACT) in 1995. This model 
became a flagship for the IFPRI, which supported 
foresight aiming at funding international agri-
cultural research around the project of a “doubly 
Green Revolution”, thanks to its format empha-
sizing the promises of technologies (Cornilleau, 
2016). This brief genealogy6 shows how economic 
models are both tools of proof and tools of power 
to defend national, or institutional, interests in the 
making of international agricultural policies.
The field of global agricultural models 
underwent another major change, which is at 
the heart of this article. Agricultural models have 
received renewed attention since the 4th report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) concluded in 2007 that agriculture is both 
a major driver of climate change and an area 
particularly affected by it, with worrying impacts 
on food security. Decision-makers now expect 
models to allow them to reflect on the interac-
tions between agriculture, food, energy, and the 
environment. The ‘climatisation’ of the agricul-
tural agenda had a counterpart in the ‘climatisa-
tion’ of the modelling field, which is twofold. First, 
equilibrium models seek to better represent the 
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environment and climate change by relying on 
agroecological zones instead of political divides 
(such as countries or regions) and they tend to 
adopt a modular structure (what enables them 
to add modules representing the environment). 
Second, integrated models, another modelling 
tradition7 grounded in the Club of Rome perspec-
tive focused on the interactions between human 
activities and the environment, were increasingly 
seen as more credible to represent the environ-
ment than equilibrium models, which conceive of 
agriculture as an industrial sector. This was all the 
more the case that in the 2000s, integrated models 
sought to provide more details on the equilibrium 
of the economy, hence undermining equilibrium 
models’ added value. These evolutions8 show 
that the boundaries and the structure of the field 
evolved after the ‘climatisation’ of agriculture. 
Incumbents and challengers in the ‘clima-
tised’ modelling field
The structure of the modelling field is defined by 
the relative positions of modelling organizations 
according to the ‘capital’ (Bourdieu, 2015) of their 
model. Each model positioned in the field draws 
its properties from other models, and these rela-
tions are conveyed in the formalism of models. 
There is a consensus on the capital specific of the 
field, on “what is at stake”, and on the ‘rules’ of the 
field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 10-11), i.e. mod-
elers agree on a broad definition of what a good 
model is, and on the ways for a model to improve 
its value and its position in the field. 
Part of this consensus is a recognition of the 
shortcomings inherent to these models. Modelers 
recognize that the existing theories are inad-
equate to describe the complexity of the agri-
cultural and food system at a global scale. They 
nonetheless have to translate them into models 
via a set of equations linking the variables that 
determine global agricultural production (popula-
tion, eating habits, urbanization, etc.) and global 
food consumption (yield or production estimates, 
price elasticities9, etc.). Once a representation 
of agriculture established, data are not always 
available10, and are often of poor quality11. Conse-
quently, modelers evaluate models through two 
channels: (i) the reputation of the model in the 
academic field, assessed through peer review, 
(ii) the model’s ability to help decision making 
through quantified scenarios. The modelling 
field interacts closely with the academic field 
and the political field, and the capital specific to 
the modelling field depends on the amount of 
capital obtained in these two fields: a good model 
is a model which is deemed both credible and 
legitimate. Scenario building is the main source 
of revenue: dominant modelling teams reinvest 
the profits they make with scenarios in improving 
their model (by adding a new module for 
instance), which then helps them find new clients, 
and thus improve their position in the field. This 
creates a hierarchy, with models “which received 
a seal of approval” and “dominate whatever the 
subject is” (in a modeler’s terms) above the others. 
The following subsection describes the 
dynamics of the field since its ‘climatisation’. 
First, integrated models tried to benefit from the 
new framework to improve their position and to 
challenge the ‘incumbents’ of the field, i.e. equilib-
rium models (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Then, 
other challengers use ‘subversion’ or ‘succession’ 
strategies (Bourdieu, 2015). 
Integrated models challenge 
equilibrium models
Two models were characterized by interviewees 
as dominant, stemming from different model-
ling traditions (equilibrium models vs. integrated 
models): the IFPRI’s IMPACT model, and the Global 
Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM) devel-
oped since 2008 by the International Institute 
for Applied System Analysis (IIASA). The IIASA is 
a research institute created in 1971 to conduct 
research on ‘world problems’ in the context of the 
Cold War, which became a major research institute 
in the modelling of climate change (Dahan, 2007). 
Although they come from different traditions, 
they both changed to be more relevant to the ‘cli-
matized’ agenda and now have a similar modular 
form and both propose a spatialization of their 
results. IMPACT transformed its partial equilib-
rium format into a modular structure, and uses 
agroecological zones. As for GLOBIOM, it relates 
human activities (food, fiber, energy, industry) 
with both environmental and economic equilib-
riums. IMPACT has long dominated the field and 
still benefits from its “return on investment”, in a 
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modeler’s terms. It has become a reference tool 
for providing foresight on food security and mal-
nutrition. However, it has been deemed less rel-
evant than GLOBIOM to provide scenarios on the 
interactions between agriculture, environment, 
and energy, as it uses a database representing 
both forests and farming. According to interview-
ees, IMPACT would be threatened if GLOBIOM 
were able to improve the way it represents food 
security:
– You were saying that GLOBIOM is the most 
dominant model?
[…] It is a dominant model in terms of publications, 
and in terms of the issues dealt with: […] they’ve 
got farming, they’ve got a very good forestry 
model, etc. […] GLOBIOM is heavily requested by 
the European Commission and has been chosen 
to evaluate everything that has to do with biofuels 
issues. […] [But] IMPACT is always the model 
used to evaluate food security. So GLOBIOM on 
the issues of food security has not reached that 
supremacy yet, but given what and how much 
they publish … The farming and climate variability 
issues are blind spots for food security issues and 
IMPACT does not have that at all. […] So in a couple 
of years, GLOBIOM will certainly strongly compete 
with IMPACT on those issues.
The ‘climatisation’ of the field has helped chal-
lengers compete with incumbents, and GLOBIOM 
has improved its position in the field, accumulat-
ing both scientific and political capital quickly. 
Subversion and succession attempts 
Not all models are as successful as GLOBIOM when 
entering the ‘climatised’ field. I use Bourdieu’s 
(2015) concepts of ‘subversion’ and ‘succession’ 
to describe their strategies. Some new entrants 
try to challenge the dominant actors by offering 
a slightly different definition of what is at stake in 
the field, i.e. a subversion strategy. For example, 
French modelling organizations put more empha-
sis on the analytical power of models and their 
heuristic use. They see foresight as a way “to con-
struct desired futures and test their consistency 
and viability” with the help of models, which is 
typical of the French foresight culture (Dorin and 
Joly, 2019). Expert knowledge is more important 
than the model itself, what contrasts with IFPRI’s 
foresight practices, as a French modeler explains:
The idea [with models] is to carry out a “plausibility 
test” of the scenarios. Basically we do scenarios, 
then we look at whether they are coherent, 
whether it works or not. This is something that is 
done differently from what IFPRI does, where the 
IMPACT model is really at the centre of the work. 
Here, let’s say, the centre of the work is really all 
that is done with the experts [who build scenarios] 
and then we look, we test if the coherence works 
[with the model] and that’s it. IFPRI’s scenarios 
are based more on the results of these models: 
[...] price evolution, need for investment, etc. is 
calculated by the IMPACT model, so it is really an 
approach that is completely different. 
This approach is grounded in a definition of eco-
nomics as a social science, whose predictions 
could therefore only be considered as insights. 
Even if decision-makers tend to see modelled 
scenarios as a ‘crystal ball’ in the terms of a mod-
eler, French modelers consider that this should be 
avoided, for instance though a participatory and 
transparent approach to foresight. This vision is 
supported by a different model form than domi-
nant models, as in the case of the French model 
Globagri, which was used in integrated modelling 
(the Nexus Land-Use (NLU) model) and in scenario 
building (the Agrimonde foresight). Globagri 
focuses on world physical food biomass balances 
(resources, trade, uses), without considering 
prices. NLU, developed by a French research cen-
tre, provides scenarios such as reduction in meat 
consumption or a balance between undernutri-
tion in the South and over-nutrition in the North, 
which are not possible with other models. Its sim-
plicity renders NLU transparent for users, and it 
has easily modifiable parameters: its developers 
argue that it enables debate with non-specialists. 
French research centres also used Agribiom (Joly 
and Dorin, 2019), then Globagri, to develop the 
Agrimonde foresight, which explores a certain 
definition of agroecology: (i) change in diet, (ii) 
reducing food and agricultural waste, (iii) favour-
ing biodiversity and ecological intensification. 
As a model’s legitimacy depends on its links 
with other legitimate models (Cornilleau, 2016; 
Leblond and Trottier, 2016), other new entrants 
adopt a ‘succession’ strategy: they try to copy the 
form used by incumbents or to use some of their 
data. They also agree with incumbents’ definition 
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of the capital of the field: they consider modelling 
as a tool for evidence-based policy-making. These 
strategies face two difficulties. First, accessing 
the data, the code, or the modules developed 
by a dominant model is not easy: they are kept 
secret as they provide the dominant model with 
a temporary monopoly on certain topics, and the 
associated revenues in terms of scenario building. 
This explains for instance the difficulties faced by 
a team in their collaboration with IIASA, the goal 
being to access some of GLOBIOM’s modules, as a 
modeler relates:
They have a strategy, aimed at GLOBIOM. […] So, 
well, they try to collaborate. [Sarcastic] They send 
people who never come back. They try to retrieve 
bits. Now, they have succeeded, but completely 
indirectly thanks to [an international expert in 
modelling]. He succeeded in obtaining data from 
[…] GLOBIOM livestock modules. So in the end, it 
ended up at [the team] via a convoluted path.
Another challenge of ‘succession’ strategies is to 
identify the added value of a new model as com-
pared to incumbents, in order to generate orders 
for scenarios that would make the model profit-
able. The FAO has recruited a well-known modeler 
in the sub-field of equilibrium models to develop 
a model, with the hope that it would challenge 
the supremacy of the IFPRI’s model. This modeler 
explained that the purpose of this project was for 
FAO to obtain a tool that reflected its “own view”: 
– So the FAO wanted a model to compete with 
IFPRI’s model?
That’s a very good question; there is a lot of 
discussion about that. I’m not sure we’ve resolved 
it yet, but it’s possible that these efforts will 
eventually merge with the IFPRI’s [as they] […] are 
very similar. […] But we’ve had problems in the 
past. There are concerns in the FAO that it needs to 
represent our own view, that it’s our scenarios, and 
that we are not just taking IFPRI scenarios.
Yet the FAO foresight team had little human and 
financial resources, so the profitability of its new 
model was all the more pressing. This hostile con-
text made a succession strategy difficult, and the 
FAO finally decided to merge its project with the 
IFPRI’s model. The FAO is now compelled to com-
mission IFPRI (as the previous team using ‘succes-
sion’ does with IIASA) to get scenarios: they are 
not allowed to develop their “own view” through 
models, but have outsourced this research.
In this first section, I developed an overview 
of the dynamics of the field of global agricultural 
models, showing that all models are not deemed 
equally credible and legitimate to represent agri-
culture under climate change. The ‘climatisation’ 
of the field generates a competition between 
equilibrium models (as incumbents) and inte-
grated models (as challengers). New entrants 
also attempt to replace the incumbent models 
via subversion or succession. If succession fails, 
subversion lays the groundwork for a definition of 
the stake of the field which is different from that 
of the incumbents, in which models are as much 
analytical tools for imagining the future as they 
are evidence-based policy instruments.
Homologies between the 
modelling field and the field 
of global governance
In what follows, I describe how the field of model 
producers is related to the field of model users. 
These users are the modelling organizations 
themselves, but also the stakeholders of the 
global governance of agriculture (States, NGOs, 
companies, etc.) which is fragmented between 
international organizations (United Nations, FAO, 
World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), 
etc.). I define global governance as “complex, 
dense, and multidirectional networks” in which 
governments are influenced by international 
organizations, research institutes, NGOs, and 
companies (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). 
This governance increasingly relies on the use of 
models: through new institutions, such as science-
policy interfaces inspired by the IPCC (Miller, 2007; 
Haas, 2017), and through new practices, such as 
the quantification of the performance of interna-
tional policies (Bezes et al., 2016). In this section, 
I introduce the concept of ‘homology’ (Bourdieu, 
2015) to account for certain inter-field relations 
which cannot be captured by Fligstein & McAd-
am’s ‘russian dolls’ metaphor. This concept refers 
to structural parallels between fields because of 
their relative autonomy, for example between the 
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field of art producers and the field of art consum-
ers, or between the field of higher education and 
the field of power (Bourdieu, 2015). In this line, I 
show that there is a homology between the field 
of model producers and the field of model users: 
users of legitimate models are more likely to have 
powerful positions in the field of global govern-
ance than the users of dominated models, what I 
show through two examples. 
First, I investigate the competition between 
models as homologous with the competition 
between participants in a science-policy interface 
launched in 2002 by the World Bank and the 
FAO: the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Science and Technology (IAASTD), which has an 
intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder format. 
Then, I consider these homologies through the use 
of models as indicators for international policy-
making, through the cases of the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 
design and evaluation of agricultural policies for 
Africa by international organizations. Previous 
research on science-policy interfaces has empha-
sized the ‘mutual construction’ of a modelling 
type and the associated political field (Shackley 
and Wynne, 1995). What I show here, however, is 
the interest of describing the struggles between 
different models within science-policy interfaces 
or evidence-based policy making. The concept of 
homology allows to look at the co-construction 
of a plurality of competing models with a global 
governance, which is both complex and multi-
sited and riddled with tensions between diploma-
cies and other stakeholders.
The politics of modelling in science-policy 
interfaces: No model, no voice
To give a sense of how these homologies are 
revealed in science-policy interfaces, I consider 
the role of the IFPRI’s IMPACT model in the IAASTD 
process, and how it laid the groundwork for the 
French Agribiom model described in the previ-
ous section. The IAASTD was initially asked to 
reflect on the possible futures for agriculture on 
the basis of scenarios created with IMPACT. Doing 
so, the IASSTD Advisory Committee capitalised on 
the excellent academic reputation of the IMPACT 
model and also followed science-policy inter-
faces, such as the Millenium Ecological Assess-
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ment (MEA) and the IPCC, which used IMPACT to 
represent world agriculture. Yet the multi-stake-
holder format of the IAASTD led to a debate on 
scenario making, and several authors disagreed 
with the weight given to economic models and/
or with the choice of this specific model. Resist-
ance was encountered from certain NGOs rep-
resented in the IAASTD, who accused models of 
being an elitist tool. They argued that models are 
hardly transparent for those without economics 
training and that they therefore do not facilitate 
inclusive deliberations on the future of agricul-
ture (Scoones, 2009). Being based on neo-classical 
economics, the IMPACT model was also rejected 
by economists from other traditions. A participant 
recounts the criticism that a modeler from the 
IFPRI received during his presentation of the first 
version of IMPACT-based scenarios:
So they began with a General Assembly […] and 
there were reactions [from authors] in the room, 
they said: ‘no, but wait, the parameters you choose 
for your models’. Models have been criticized 
as being econometric models by that kind of 
heterogeneous group, with native peoples, farmers 
from Zimbabwe, neo-institutionalist economic 
researchers. Everyone had something to say, 
because everyone could speak, I mean, you’ve just 
got to raise your hand and say what you want to 
say. So they took a beating!
In the end, the IMPACT model was not used to pre-
pare the scenarios of the IAASTD, which became 
mostly qualitative. The IFPRI decried this defeat, 
as a failure to demonstrate the relevance of the 
IMPACT model. The two sponsors of the IAASTD 
also joined in this disappointment: the World 
Bank and the FAO, who develop and promote 
similar equilibrium models. Company representa-
tives likewise attacked the scientific validity of this 
assessment, because of the absence of modelled 
scenarios and of their perception of an overrepre-
sentation of the social sciences, at the expense of 
mainstream economics and agricultural sciences. 
This was the case of Syngenta; whose representa-
tive wrote an article on IAASTD in NewScientist.
com. The IAASTD has been weakened by these 
attacks: despite its “business as usual is not an 
option” motto, and its recommendations to con-
sider agroecology and food sovereignty, it had 
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less political impact than previous assessments 
using incumbent models (the MEA or the IPCC).
After their participation in the IAASTD, some 
actors were motivated to enter the modelling 
field. This was the case of French research insti-
tutes, whose experts have had the impression of 
being left out because their institution had not 
developed a model. Models structured the debate 
to such an extent that it seemed impossible for 
experts to “have a say” without referring to a 
model, hence the French disarray:
We had French participants in the chapters on 
scenarios. […] [A French author] came back 
completely miserable saying: “well, we can’t say 
anything; the IFPRI has a say in it, the Indians, 
the Dutch, their model this, their model that, but 
we didn’t have a say in it, I won’t go back to that 
group, […] I won’t be the one who hasn’t got 
anything to say”. It was after that that we launched 
Agrimonde, even though we knew we wouldn’t 
have Agrimonde ready in time for the IAASTD, but, 
at least, the next time we would be in the game, we 
would have our say.
On this basis, French institutes decided to develop 
their own model (Agribiom), which would be the 
basis of the first Agrimonde foresight. The sec-
ond version of Agrimonde, based on the Globa-
gri model, associated NGOs (OXFAM) and social 
movements (The International Planning Commit-
tee for Food Sovereignty), who believed it could 
be an advocacy tool for agroecology. This exam-
ple shows that scientific controversies on agri-
culture, which are debated within science-policy 
interfaces such as the IAASTD or the IPCC, are 
both reflected in and reinforced by the struggles 
in the field of agricultural models. 
Models as indicators: Unequal access to 
evidence-based policy making
Models are instrumental in science-policy inter-
faces, as foresight is the basis of their policy rec-
ommendations. But economic models are also 
increasingly being used as indicators to develop 
evidence-based policies and to quantify the per-
formance of policy-making, as it has been shown 
for example in healthcare (Sjögren and Helgesson, 
2007). Agriculture is no exception, especially at 
the international level. International organizations 
involved in the global governance of agriculture 
claim to develop evidence-based public policies, 
i.e. using data to target measurable objectives, 
define policy options, and evaluate public poli-
cies. Although United Nations (UN) agencies have 
always used data to demonstrate the effective-
ness of their programmes to convince donors, this 
trend has increased since the launch of the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. These 
‘goals’ are used by international organizations to 
quantify the performance of development poli-
cies, to harmonize their actions through a com-
mon framework, and to make funding allocation 
decisions. The MDGs have been seen as evidence 
of a shift toward a “new public management” of 
the UN (Bezes et al., 2016). Previously, since the 
late 1980s, the World Bank, which has always 
invested heavily in evaluation (Goldman, 2005), 
has recommended using economic equilibrium 
models as instruments for ex ante or ex post evalu-
ation in various areas, including agriculture and 
food security (Dervis et al., 1989). 
The IMPACT model was used to assess progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goal of 
reducing hunger. The dynamics of the modelling 
field, i.e. the fact that GLOBIOM challenged 
IMPACT had an impact on the respective roles of 
their modelling organizations in making these 
performance indicators. IIASA invested in the new 
UN agenda with GLOBIOM, through the prepara-
tion of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
a set of 169 indicators meant as a successor to 
the MDGs for the post-2015 agenda. Unlike the 
MDGs, the SDGs highlight the links between over-
consumption in the North and poverty in the 
South and examine the interactions between the 
environment, energy, climate change, and food 
security (Figure 1). On these two issues, GLOBIOM 
was deemed better able than IMPACT to assess 
possible interactions and trade-offs, due to its 
integrated modelling tradition.
Equilibrium models close to IMPACT are also 
used to define goals and to evaluate the renewed 
framework of African agricultural policies, in the 
context of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP), prepared by 
the African Union with technical support from the 
United Nations and the World Bank. The CAADP 
encourages foreign investment, through the 
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preparation of investment projects at the country 
level and legislative changes (e.g. biotechnology 
regulations or free trade). Models intervene in the 
three steps of policy design within the CAADP: 1) 
analysis of investment projects, 2) evaluation of 
agricultural legislation and approval of an invest-
ment plan, and 3) evaluation of programme 
implementation. The instrumental role given 
to models in the evaluation made it so that the 
IFPRI, which benefited from the legitimacy of the 
IMPACT model, took the role that might have been 
expected the FAO in its work with the CAADP. 
The competition between the IFPRI/IIASA in 
the MDGs/SDGs and the FAO/IFPRI in the CAADP 
show that using a dominant model is a better 
guarantee for an institution to shape evidence-
based policy-making. This result reinforces what 
happens in science-policy interfaces: institutions 
relying on a legitimate model are more likely to be 
well positioned in the field of global governance. 
The modelling field and the field of global govern-
ance are homologous. 
Magicians at work: Shaping the 
field through standardization
Is the alignment between the modelling field and 
the field of global governance simply ‘magic’ (Rou-
eff, 2013)? This would be the Bourdieusian reading 
of the homologies that I described in the previous 
section, which denies any underlying intentional-
ity. Yet fieldwork shows that some modelers seek 
to strategically produce homologies. This section 
describes these ‘magicians’ at work, i.e. the efforts 
of modelers to have their models used in the field 
of global governance. In this respect, I show the 
decisive role of an intercomparison research pro-
ject, the AgMIP. This project was founded in 2008 
on the impetus of crop modelers from the NASA-
Goddard Institute for Space Studies at Columbia 
University (which still leads the project), with the 
support of incumbents in the field of economic 
models. This alliance of prominent institutions 
convinced prestigious American universities such 
as Washington University, national and interna-
tional agronomic research organizations (CGIAR 
etc.), governments (United Kingdom, USA, Euro-
pean Commission), and companies (Monsanto) to 
provide funding and in-kind support. The AgMIP 
aims to connect three types of models: economic 
models, climate models, and newly developed 
global crop models, through the collaboration 
of three dedicated modelling teams (Global Eco-
nomics, Crop, and Climate teams) (Figure 2). The 
economic models presented in the previous sec-
tions are part of the Global Economics team. What 
is at stake within the AgMIP is to propose sce-
narios on global food security which can localize 
the impacts of climate change on crops and cal-
culate the related economic risks. Through these 
scenarios, investors and policymakers can prepare 
themselves for such futures12, for example by buy-
ing “climate-smart” biological or financial tech-
nologies. Another related goal of the AgMIP is to 
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compare the models of each type amongst them-
selves – including the economic models, on which 
I focus here – to explore the impacts of their dif-
ferences on foresights, and to try to reduce their 
heterogeneity in order to build foresights that are 
as consensual as possible.
 In this section, I explain first how the AgMIP was 
conceived and created by modelers as a decisive 
tool for producing homologies. Then, I show how 
the AgMIP, by promoting a standardization of 
models, shapes the modelling field according to 
the interests of the ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ 
(Fligstein, McAdam, 2012) who have accompa-
nied, and benefited from, the ‘climatisation’ of the 
field: it solves the conflict IMPACT vs. GLOBIOM, 
and it discourages models using subversion strat-
egies.
Producing homologies: From social skills to 
institutional entrepreneurship
In the neo-institutionalist perspective, all actors 
are skilled, yet “resources […] matter a lot, [such 
as] the ability to deploy money, connections to the 
government” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 181). 
Interviews with modelers show that they make 
use of such resources such as the head of the Fore-
sight Team of an international organization who 
developed equilibrium models for many interna-
tional organizations (OECD, World Bank, FAO), i.e. 
a well-endowed team directly connected with 
governance. These resources helped this actor to 
have his models mobilized as mediators (“we were 
in the middle”, he explains) of policy-decisions. 
Most revealingly, he presents the milestones of his 
career through a list of the international policies 
that he quantified and evaluated with his models, 
from trade negotiations to climate policies and 
the Millennium Development Goals:
I was in the OECD for ten years at the beginning 
of my career. And one of the big studies I worked 
on initially […] [was] a study of OECD agricultural 
policies, so the different subsidies and protection 
measures that were in place in the late 1980s, 
which was at the time a very contentious issue 
among the high-income countries, […] the United 
States and the European Commission. So, we 
were in the middle, trying to assess what were the 
economic impacts of this. […] I did a lot of work 
on the [WTO] Uruguay Round and an assessment 
of the Uruguay Round. […] And then I switched 
to working on climate change, in the mid-1990s. 
[…] When I was at the World Bank I did a lot of 
projections for the MDGs.
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Figure 2: The collaboration between AgMIP’s three teams (Agricultural Economics, Crop, Climate) and their 
expected outputs: improvements and intercomparisons of each type of models; assessments and decision 
making/capacity building. Source: www.agmip.org 
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Later in the interview, this actor explained that 
he had long wanted to create an intercompari-
son project of agricultural models, as he believed 
it would facilitate the circulation of model results 
in international policies and expertise. He hoped 
to replicate what he presented as the “success” 
of the intercomparison of climate models within 
the Energy Modelling Forum (EMF)13 created in 
the 1970s during the energy crisis. Indeed, most 
of the research conducted within the EMF, and 
the resulting changes in the climate models, have 
informed the IPCC. Even before the AgMIP was 
created, this modeler imagined the benefits of 
a hypothetical “Agricultural Modelling Forum” 
based on the EMF example: 
– Why is your Team interested in the AgMIP?
[…] EMF started in the 1970s because of the 
energy crisis. So, it was mainly a gathering of 
energy modelers […]. When the energy crisis kind 
of melted away, well climate change appeared! 
So, EMF became basically the place where a lot of 
modelling of climate change occurs; so if you look 
at the IPCC, the 3rd volume on mitigation, almost all 
that work comes from the EMF modelling group. 
It has been incredibly successful, EMF! […] So, my 
hope was that we could recreate something like 
EMF but for agriculture, that I actually called “AMF” 
for “Agriculture Modelling Forum” but right now we 
are in AgMIP, which is fine. […]
– As the EMF was largely used in the IPCC, 
your objective [with AgMIP] is also to be more 
influential in global assessments?
Sure. We’ll also influence the IPCC, especially 
volume 2, you know, on impacts, adaptation, etc., 
and vulnerability and… [...] we’ll be cited in the 
5th Assessment Report, but I think as this work 
progresses, you know, I think we’ll have more to 
feed into the volume 2 report. 
– Are there other reports that you will influence?
Yes, there are always things coming out, there will 
be a post-Rio agenda, you know the Beyond the 
MDG’s [i.e. the Sustainable Development Goals]. 
[…] I’m sure we’ll be asked to provide some 
assessment of the goals.
This modeler is confident in his ability to produce 
some of the homologies that we described in the 
previous section: he hopes to assess the Sustain-
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able Development Goals, as well as to feed into 
one of the most influential science-policy inter-
faces, the IPCC. He was willing to create an inter-
comparison device such as the AgMIP, as he was 
convinced that it would be a decisive instrument 
for this purpose. 
Hence, putting intercomparison at the service 
of homology production has been a conscious 
strategy for some modelers. However, the AgMIP 
only appeared in 2008. The ‘climatisation’ of agri-
culture made economic and crop modelers focus 
on the necessity of creating the AgMIP and consti-
tuted an opportunity for them to behave as insti-
tutional entrepreneurs, i.e. to try and shape the 
field according to their interests through “new 
identities, coalitions and hierarchies” (Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012: 84). This is consistent with Fligstein 
and McAdam’s (2012: 181) hypothesis: “entrepre-
neurs appear not in settled social fields but in 
those that are emerging or those that are on the 
verge of transformation”. The new framework of 
climatised agriculture was used by crop modelers 
to tout the merits of their global crop models, in 
alliance with economic modelers who had an 
interest in producing spatialized scenarios. They 
planned to feed into the 5th Assessment Report 
of the IPCC and the making of development indi-
cators. More generally, the AgMIP was driven by 
the preparation of scenarios for the conferences, 
programmes, etc. of the ‘climatised’ agricultural 
agenda. As an interstitial organization at the cross-
roads between the modelling field and the field of 
global governance, the AgMIP has enabled these 
actors to produce homologies between these two 
fields.
Shaping the field through standardization
Not only was the AgMIP intended to help model-
ers circulate their results in the field of expertise 
and governance, but it also favoured certain actors 
in the modelling field. This was achieved through 
the definition of a given objective and certain 
rules for AgMIP, from which dominant modelers 
would benefit more than other modelling teams. 
The AgMIP has organized the preference for cer-
tain types of models with the alleged objective of 
harmonizing them, as other interstitial organiza-
tions do, for example in the case of analysis tech-
niques used in the regulation of risks (Demortain, 
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2011). The AgMIP aimed at reducing the diversity 
of models’ outputs before these instruments are 
used by experts and decisionmakers, and this 
objective has resulted in a certain standardization 
of the models themselves. However, the AgMIP 
was not intrinsically intended to shape the field 
through standardization. There was initially an 
internal controversy within the group, at the end 
of which this vision of the AgMIP prevailed.
Harmonizing is a founding principle of the 
AgMIP (Rosenzweig et al., 2013), which seeks to 
answer the question: “why do global long-term 
scenarios for agriculture differ?” (Lampe et al., 
2014). Participants in the Global Economics 
Team of the AgMIP, whatever their position in the 
modelling field, agree that such an objective is 
needed in order for models to seem credible. This 
harmonization is justified in their eyes by the need 
to protect modelers from criticism that would 
emerge from greater heterogeneity between 
models, in the aftermath of the controversy on 
climate model reliability, following the publica-
tion of the 4th Report of the IPCC. As a modeler 
explains, what is at stake is to build a “robust 
decision” on science:
When you have results with very strong 
heterogeneities [between models], in the end you 
can’t do anything with them. [...] In the previous 
IPCC results, we finally said: “well, you can have a 
warming between 2 degrees, or even 0.5 degree 
and 8 degrees”! When we come to the decision-
maker with that kind of conclusion, well, we 
didn’t say anything! So there is a need to reduce 
the heterogeneity of the models, so all these 
intercomparison exercises have the ultimate will to 
reduce the heterogeneity of the models to finally 
reach a robust decision. 
To achieve this harmonization objective, the 
AgMIP tests the predictions of the different mod-
els of the Global Economics Team using the base-
lines of the IPCC – both its climate scenarios called 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) 
and its socio-economic scenarios, called Shared 
Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs). Through this 
lens, various economic global agricultural mod-
els propose very different results, for instance 
when one considers the impact of a given RCP 
scenario on food prices (Lampe et al., 2014). This 
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is due to their specific form, as shown in the first 
section, but also to the calibration of elasticities, 
and the choice of hypotheses (e.g. is land sup-
ply rigid? How does food consumption evolve 
when prices rise?). The AgMIP’s objective is then 
to identify as precisely as possible the origin of 
these differences, to question the choices that led 
to them, and to suggest changes in the models to 
limit divergent outcomes. The overall objective of 
this intercomparison is for the AgMIP to establish 
agricultural scenarios of reference, called Repre-
sentative Agricultural Pathways (RAPs) which are 
intended to be as influential as the IPCC’s SSPs and 
RCPs, and to complement them. 
Furthermore, this organization of work, focused 
on harmonisation and on the making of reference 
agricultural scenarios, reinforces the structure of 
the field (Table 1). As we saw in the first section, 
challengers using subversion strategies value 
more the heuristic dimension of models over 
the use of models as evidence-based tools for 
decision making, which is where incumbents and 
challengers using ‘succession’ strategies put more 
emphasis. For incumbents, the main objective of 
AgMIP is to have the results of models converge. 
For example, the IFPRI transformed IMPACT’s 
parameters after participating in the AgMIP, as 
one participant explains: 
IFPRI came out with a report in 2010 [Nelson et 
al., 2010, which is based on the IMPACT model] 
[…]: they showed a doubling of food prices by 
2050, and then another doubling with climate 
change. We were very surprised by these results. 
[…] And actually IFPRI has changed its scenarios 
very significantly, not based on what we said, 
but because of the AgMIP process. They were 
confronted and asked “why do you plan such high 
prices?” and they answered. Largely the problem 
was that they used models for kinds of medium-
term analysis and they had pretty low elasticities, 
while when you think of the long-term, there is 
much more flexibility. And when they increased 
their elasticities, food prices came down.
A modeler from a less dominant institution in 
the field considers that participating in AgMIP 
has challenged the structure of his model, e.g. its 
number of crops. Upon reflection, however, he did 
not transform his model, but instead wished to 
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preserve what he calls the “good” heterogeneity 
between models, i.e. the differences in results due 
to divergent hypotheses that are all equally valid:
– For your model, do you feel that your 
participation in the AgMIP has made a 
difference?
[...] when you are in this community and I come 
with a very simple representative crop and next 
to me there is a guy who says “there I have 21 
crops”, well, I feel a little bad. But you have to resist: 
everyone has his own questions, his own way of 
doing things, and it’s true that when I came back 
from an AgMIP meeting, I asked myself, ‘you have 
to break down the model a little more’ and then, in 
retrospect, I said to myself: ‘well, no, it doesn’t mean 
anything, considering what we want to achieve, it 
doesn’t mean anything’.
These challengers using subversion strategies 
have an interest in intercomparison projects, 
as they could help make their models known 
through publications and establish contacts with 
dominant teams. They also seek to situate their 
model in relation with others and to strengthen 
their choice of hypotheses and functional forms. 
They would have preferred that the AgMIP fol-
low the objective of deepening this “technical” 
comparison of models, precisely in order to avoid 
standardization. However, this option was not 
popular among modelers taking part in the pro-
ject, and it was rejected by the AgMIP’s Steering 
Committee, who focused on harmonizing models 
and developing scenarios to feed into the IPCC, as 
a participant recalled:
I arrived after the beginning of a second phase 
where there was some hesitation regarding which 
objective to pursue. […] Meaning when do we 
really dive into what [one of the coordinators of 
the Global Economics Team] calls ‘deep diving’, 
meaning when do we dive into the model’s 
mechanics, or do we finally ignore all that, and 
go for politically orientated outcomes, by making 
scenarios, etc. […]. There was the influence of 
the Steering Committee […] which was going for 
the Representative Agricultural Pathways, so we 
eventually went for that.
The overall effect of the AgMIP on the modelling 
field has been to have helped GLOBIOM challenge 
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IMPACT, whereas it has kept models using subver-
sion strategies out of the game. Some AgMIP par-
ticipants consider that the IIASA used the AgMIP 
as a “launching pad”, as GLOBIOM’s superiority has 
been stressed in the publications which came out 
of the first phase of the AgMIP (Lampe et al., 2014). 
These publications then became a cornerstone 
of the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report. IIASA used 
intercomparison strategically with the GLOBIOM 
model, producing a new homology between the 
modelling field and the field of global govern-
ance. GLOBIOM, formerly a challenger in the field, 
has become a new incumbent, partly thanks to 
AgMIP. This does not mean that all the homolo-
gies I documented before arise from the partici-
pation of modelling institutions in the AgMIP: not 
only modelers use more generally their skills for 
this purpose, but other arenas – such as academic 
conferences – may have also created standardi-
zation between models. Yet, the AgMIP helps us 
understand recent changes in the field of agricul-
tural models since it was ‘climatised’, as it reveals 
certain mechanisms through which the competi-
tion between models has been channelled. The 
construction of an intercomparision between dif-
ferent models resolves the modelling conflict in 
favour of a new dominant model, and at the same 
time allows for homology between modelling and 
politics. 
Conclusion
In this article, I used field theory to analyse the 
competition between organizations which 
develop world agricultural models since the ‘cli-
matisation’ of the global agricultural agenda. I 
showed a change in the field, with the integrated 
modelling tradition taking the lead over equilib-
rium models. Despite this change in its structure, 
the capital, the stake, and the rules of the field do 
not change. The dominant models are still those 
that manage to play to the best of their ability as 
intermediaries between modelling and politics, 
i.e. to accumulate both scientific and political 
capital. Even though GLOBIOM (IIASA) challenged 
IMPACT (IFPRI), both models are similar in this 
respect. This specific structure of the modelling 
field explains the homologies that I documented 
between the modelling field and the field of 
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global governance. I also demonstrated that these 
homologies are reinforced by the strategies of cer-
tain modelers, who behave as institutional entre-
preneurs, feeding into the ‘climatised’ agricultural 
framework and using the change in the field to 
improve their positions. Intercomparison projects, 
such as the AgMIP, are instrumental in this regard: 
they were created by modelers who had long 
wanted to have the results of their models more 
easily circulated in the field of global governance. 
These actors had an interest in the objectives 
and rules of the AgMIP, which generated stand-
ardization. I explained how these rules helped to 
solve the main conflict of the field between the 
two modelling traditions, and at the same time 
facilitated homologies between modelling and 
politics. Challengers using subversion, who would 
have assigned other goals to this intercompara-
tive work, have been marginalized in both the 
modelling field and in the field of global govern-
ance. As suggested by Roueff (2013), homologies 
are not magic without magicians, i.e. an automatic 
alignment of positions between the field of model 
producers and the field of model users. Homolo-
gies are rather strategically produced. 
This article contributes to the interest of STS in 
field theory (Berman, 2014; Hess and al., 2017), but 
it specifically aims to analyse knowledge-power 
relations in global governance. The co-production-
nist research agenda on global governance has 
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Table 1: The participation in the AgMIP from two contrasted positions in the modelling field: a challenger using a 
subversion strategy vs. an incumbent. Source: interviews
AgMIP 
experience 
/ Capacity to 
structure the field 
Goals for AgMIP / 
Definition of what is at 
stake in the field
Effects on his own 





Position in the field
Challenger





thing”; “There is a 
core group we are 
not part of”
Having “substantial” 
debates through “deep 
diving” i.e. comparing 
the technical properties 
of models
No change, but 
clarifying their choices 









Incumbent “I have wanted to 
create the AgMIP 
for a long time”
Influence expertise (e.g. 
IPCC) and indicators for 
evidence-based public 
policies (e.g. Sustainable 
Development Goals) 
New specifications of 
models to obtain more 
similar outcomes 
Distribution of 
the topical issues 
on the political 
agenda according 
to the comparative 
advantage of each 
model
often looked at individual given expert commit-
tees and how they co-construct their own scien-
tific legitimacy with a political body – such as the 
IPCC with climate governance (Miller, 2007) or the 
Codex Alimentarius with the WTO (Winickoff and 
Bushey, 2010). As global governance is complex, 
and often multi-level and overlapping, a recent 
research invites to go beyond a unified vision of 
‘science’ coproducing ‘policy’ at a global scale, 
by describing several standards-setting bodies’ 
attempt to earn a form of ‘epistemic jurisdiction’14 
(Winickoff and Mondou, 2017). In this line, field 
theory allows to account for the strategies of a 
plurality of scientific modelling organizations in 
the field of global agricultural governance, riddled 
with conflicting visions and interests. Even if the 
mathematical form of models suggests that they 
would be universally valid (Fourcade, 2006), global 
models are ‘situated’ and their respective prefer-
ences for a given agriculture are not representa-
tive of all countries’ nor all stakeholders’ interests. 
Despite attempts to standardize the field of 
models, research organizations using subversion 
keep developing their models, claiming a right to 
define agricultural policies, and hoping to become 
influential in the powerful organizations of the 
field of governance. Based on this result, further 
research could consider through the lens of field 
theory how the stakeholders of global govern-
ance struggle through the production and/or use 
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of scientific devices (such as models) for the right 
to define international policies.
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Notes
1 Models’ outputs – e.g. the 70% increase in the global food production by 2050, a result of a FAO model 
– fuel the productionnist narrative which is instrumental to agrifood industry and export-countries 
(Tomlinson, 2013).
2 In 2010 the team consisted of the ten following models and institutions: AIM (developed by the NIES/
Japan), ENVISAGE (FAO/World Bank), EPPA (MIT/USA), FARM, (USDA) GTEM (ANTARES/Australia), MAGNET 
(LEI-WUR, Netherlands), GCAM (PNNL, USA), GLOBIOM (IIASA), IMPACT (IFPRI), MAgPIE (PIK, Germany).
3 They were actually inspired by Bourdieu in this: for him, fields (e.g. the scientific field, the political field, 
etc.) are specialized subfields of the ‘social field’ (society), which is not a meta-field, but is a conglomera-
tion of all fields.
4 It refers to a “form of embedding whereby actors that make up smaller collectivities are located within 
larger strategic action fields that contain larger collectivities” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 59)
5 These institutions developed both computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (representing the 
whole economy) or partial equilibrium (PE) models (focusing on the dynamics of the agricultural sector).
6 More details are provided by Leblond and Trottier (2016) and by Joly and Lacombe (2017).
7 Four modelling traditions have been working on this difficult task since the 1970s (Leblond and Trottier, 
2016): 1) economic models 2) biophysical models, representing global agricultural productivity (potential 
yields according to agronomic theory; actual yields according to databases), 3) integrated models, 4) 
hybrid models, which link socio-economic databases to agronomic databases at a pixel scale thanks to 
satellite-produced datasets.
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8 A last evolution is that both equilibrium and integrated models benefited from the democratization of 
satellite datasets in the 2000s: “they integrated Geographic Information Systems and began projecting 
their results onto pixel grids” (Leblond and Trottier, 2016: 7), what enables them to localize even more 
precisely the agriculture-climate interactions.
9 Price elasticity quantifies the change in demand for a good caused by the change in its price.
10 Databases produced by the FAO or by networks of modelers follow agricultural chains, so mixed or 
alternate crops encouraged by agroecology cannot be represented, for example.
11 This is due to due to problems commensurating at the international scale a variety of soils, climates, etc., 
but also because some countries want to keep them secret for trade-related reasons.
12 Source: http://www.agmip.org/feature-video/ 
13 The EMF is probably the oldest model intercomparison, but there has been a rise in these projects in 
the context of the controversies on the validity of models used by the IPCC, as can be seen in the Inter-
Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP) on the effects of climate change, or the Integrated 
Assessment Modelling Consortium (IAMC) on integrated models.
14 This concept refers to “the power to produce or warrant technical knowledge for a given political 
community, topical arena or geographical territory” (Winickoff and Mondou, 2017: 7). 
Appendix 1. List of Acronyms
AgMIP: Agricultural Models Inter-comparison and Improvement Project 
CAADP: Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CGIAR: Consultative Group in International Agricultural Research
EMF: Energy Modelling Forum 
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GLOBIOM (model): Global Biosphere Management Model
IAASTD: International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge Science and Technology
IFPRI: International Food Policies Research Institute
IIASA: International Institute for Applied System Analysis
IMPACT (model): International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
MEA: Millennium Ecological Assessment
NLU (model): Nexus-Land Use
OECDE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
UN: United Nations
WTO: World Trade Organization
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